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1. Abstract 
Real life problem 
In most cases, a divorce in Cianjur means that the wife must find sufficient resources to provide 
for herself and her children. For women living around the poverty line the only safety net 
available for them and their children is a return to their parents or a remarriage. The safety net 
theoretically provided for by alimony, although legally established, is not functioning well.  
 
Child alimony 
With regard to child alimony, compliance by ex-husbands with decisions of the Islamic Court is 
generally poor. Most women, however, don’t seek redress at the Islamic Court. Psychological and 
practical barriers are mentioned as reasons for this. Non-court alternatives are virtually non-
existent. Ex-husbands generally only make insufficient and irregular financial contributions to 
their children’s upbringing. Almost half simply divorce or abandon their wife without providing 
any alimony. There is no forum available were women can seek effective redress for their 
grievances. Generally, women simply leave the conflict unresolved or try to resolve the conflict 
within the private sphere.  
 
Spousal alimony 
Decisions of the Islamic Court regarding spousal alimony are more frequently followed. Women 
who divorce at the initiative of their husband (talak divorce) have certain spousal alimony rights - 
both under national and Islamic law. Husbands almost always comply with Islamic Court 
decisions on spousal alimony because court procedures dictate that spousal alimony must be paid 
during the last court-hearing. However, most divorces are initiated by the wife, in which case she 
has no right to spousal alimony. Of those couples who elect to arrange their divorce unofficially 
(i.e.  out of court) only in 23 percent of the cases make spousal alimony arrangements (nafkah 
idah , or spousal alimony provided by the husband during the compulsory waiting period of three 
months after a divorce in which the wife may not remarry) , and these arrangements are usually 
poorly executed.  
 
Civil servants 
According to government regulations, both spousal alimony and child alimony may be directly 
withdrawn from the salary of an ex-husband after a request to the ex-husband’s superior. Yet, 
even when clear legal avenues of redress are in place, women are not always aware of them, or 
are reluctant to use them. If a woman does approach their husband’s superior, they are often 
successful in getting child support transferred to their account. However, in court orders, spousal 
alimony is rarely based upon the government regulations, but rather on (state) Islamic law only. 
 
The example of civil servants shows that redress for women denied child alimony can be 
effective where simple mechanisms for ensuring compliance are in place, provided that the 
husband has a stable income out of which alimony contributions can be taken.  However, for 
most people - particularly the poor - the economic situation is very different. For most women in 
Cianjur, their only option is moral pressure on their husband. Until enforcement mechanisms are 
put in place, a court decision on alimony is in most cases no more than a toothless weapon to 
increase this moral pressure. 
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2. Cianjur: a rural Muslim district where people marry young 
 
This case study concerns divorced Muslim women in the district of Cianjur who, according to 
both national law and Islamic law, have the right to child alimony and spousal alimony. In this 
respect, there is no tension between the normative systems of the state and Islam. However, with 
regard to the social practice of divorce itself, there are important tensions between state norms as 
laid down in national law and local Islamic norms. According to the marriage law,1 all Muslim 
divorces must be brought before the Islamic Court.2  Yet, social practice in Cianjur shows that 
most people prefer to divorce ‘according to religion’ – that is, outside court and by repudiation 
(talak) – because it is cheap and less cumbersome. These divorces are not recognized by the state, 
and accordingly these women do not have the option to seek enforcement of their alimony rights 
– or other divorce-related rights – within the court system. 
 
If couples do divorce at the Islamic Court, women can file for a court decision on alimony at the 
same time as the divorce case, and with no extra procedural costs. Surprisingly, few of the 
women who divorce at the Islamic Court of Cianjur make use of this legal opportunity. There is 
also the option to file for a separate alimony case after the divorce has been granted, but in 2006, 
2007 and 2008 there were no such cases listed at the Islamic Court of Cianjur. 
 
The main subject of this research is redress in spousal and child alimony cases brought before the 
Islamic Court of Cianjur, and the execution (or otherwise) of these court decisions. However, 
because all the data indicates that bringing alimony cases to court is not common practice – and 
even less so among the poor – this case study explores non-court redress as well. The case study 
focuses upon the following question: 
 
Where women are denied spousal alimony (nafkah muta’ah and nafkah idah) and  or 
child alimony (nafkah anak) by their former husbands, despite having a right to such 
alimony , what are the rules, actors and factors that affect the extent to which these 
women gain access to fair, effective and accountable redress? 
 
Methodology 
To answer this question I have researched all alimony records from the Islamic Court of Cianjur 
for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008.  I traced back and interviewed a sample of the women who 
had filed requests for alimony at the court, to examine the extent to which the court’s decisions 
had been executed, particularly regarding child alimony, since spousal alimony is paid by the 
husband in court before the divorce is finalised.  I also investigated how these women perceived 
the court process, posed more general questions about the background to each case. This was not 
an easy task, as many women had since moved away and were difficult to find. 
 
In addition, I have followed a substantial number of court divorce hearings (more than 100) to see 
                                                 
1 Law No 1 of 1974 regarding Marriage. 
2 The Islamic Court (pengadilan agama) is one of the four branches of Indonesia’s national legal system, which is 
headed by the Supreme Court (the other three being the General Court, the Administrative Court and the Military 
Court). People can appeal first-instance Islamic Court decisions at the Islamic high courts. The Islamic Courts are 
headed by the Supreme Court, where people can bring an appeal in cassation.  
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how the subject of alimony is treated by litigants and judges. This data was supplemented by 
secondary data and qualitative data obtained from interviews with judges and other personnel at 
the Islamic Court of Cianjur, including experts and key-informants such as lawyers, 
intermediaries and others. 
 
At an early stage, it became clear that most women in Cianjur don’t divorce at the Islamic Court, 
and of those who do, most do not seek a court decision on alimony. Civil servants and the wives 
of civil servants are overrepresented in alimony cases. To get a broader picture of the social 
reality of divorce and alimony in Cianjur, an alimony survey was designed and a representative 
sample of 120 divorced women with children were interviewed in 4 villages (desa) and 4 town 
quarters (kampung) in three sub-districts (Cianjur, Cipanas and Pagelaran). 
 
Research location Cianjur 
Cianjur is a rural district (kabupaten) in the province of West Java, and is located between the 
cities of Jakarta and Bandung. It has a population of 2,122,756 (2007). The north and south of the 
district are separated by a mountain range and by the long, winding road that connects the 
northern town Cianjur with the south, and which makes south-north travel a time-consuming 
operation. The Islamic Court is located  in the district capital of Cianjur (population of 150,000), 
at the crossroads to Jakarta, Bandung and Sukabumi. 
 
Figure 1. Cianjur in West Java 
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Farmers, small entrepreneurs and high unemployment 
The district Cianjur is known for its rice, and rice fields are abundant. Agriculture is the main 
business, and rice – especially the local breed  pandangwangi rice – is the main crop. This is 
reflected in Cianjur’s employment figures (2007). Fifty two percent of the working population 
are farmers, 21 percent of the population are categorized as ‘small entrepreneurs’ and 10 percent 
are active in services.3 
 
18.5 percent of Cianjur’s population is officially registered as being poor. That is slightly higher 
than the national poverty rate, which is 16.6 percent. The poverty line for the province of West 
Java (2008) is set at Rp180,821 per month per family member for the cities (kota) and Rp 
155,367 for rural areas like Cianjur. This is almost half the amount used by the UN to define 
poverty.4   
 
Another way of measuring poverty is by looking at indicators of the most basic needs (see Box 
1).  According to this measure, only 11.8 percent of  the families in Cianjur would be categorized 
as poor (keluarga pra-sejahtera).5 
 
Box 1.  Indicators for poor families 
 
Poor families ( Keluarga Pra Sejahtera) 
Are families that are not able yet to fulfil all of the five basic 
needs of a prosperous family (Keluarga Sejahtera Tahap I). 
 
Prosperous Family (Keluarga Sejahtera Tahap I) 
Are families that already are able to fulfil the basic needs. 
 
The basic needs are: 
1. In general each family member eats two times a day or more. 
2. Each family member has different clothes for home, 
work/school and for special occasions. 
3. The house of the family has a good roof, good floor and good 
walls. 
4. The family is able to go to a health service if a child is sick or a 
couple wants to practice family planning. 
5. All children between the ages of 7 and 15 go to school. 
 
                                                 
3 Penyusunan Sosial Ekonomi Daerah (Suseda) 2005, BPS Provinsi Jawa Barat dan Bapeda Propinsi Jawa Barat [The 
2005 Regional Socio-Economical Survey, Central Bureau of  Statistics and Regional Spatial Planning Bureau, 
Province of West Java]. 
4 The UN has set the poverty line at an income of  US$ 1,25 a day and US$ 2,00 a day. Calculated to rupiah per 
month this equals approximately Rp 375.000 and Rp 600.000 (exchange rates of July 2009). 
5 My own calculations of data from the tables ‘Kepala Keluarga Pra S dan KS1’ [Poor families and Prosperous 
Families 1]  and ‘Kepala Keluarga menurut tingkat pendidikan yang memperoleh bantuan modal’   [Household 
heads according to education level that receive social security benefit]  acquired from the Cianjur’s government’s 
official website www.cianjurkab.go.id. 70.335 poor households in Cianjur divided by 594.323 total households in 
Cianjur multiplied by 100 percent  equals 11.8 percent. 
 5
Statistics from 2007 from the district show that 24 percent of households do not have a member 
of the household who works.6 This means that the unemployment figure is high compared to the 
nation figure of 9.7 percent (2007).7  
 
High poverty and unemployment figures are relevant here not only because ‘economic reasons’ 
are one of the major reasons for divorce – just after ’no harmonious relationship‘8 – but also 
because it is less likely that a woman whose former husband was poor or unemployed (so that he 
could not contribute to the family’s income anyway) will receive alimony payments from him.  
 
Cianjur’s Sundanese Muslim-ness 
The vast majority of the 2.1 million inhabitants of Cianjur are ethnic Sundanese, and the district 
capital Cianjur considers  itself to be the centre of  Sundanese language and culture. Again and 
again people emphasise that ‘in Cianjur the use of Sundanese language is still proper'.  
 
Furthermore, 99 percent of the population of Cianjur is Muslim. The self-image of piety and 
Sundanese-ness of Cianjur is reflected in the district’s motto maos, mamaos, maenpo. Maos is the 
act of reciting the Qur’an, mamaos is the performance of traditional poetry, and maenpo refers to 
the martial arts form pencak silat. The district government has tried to underline the Muslim-ness 
of ‘kota santri’ (city of santri)9 Cianjur through the adoption of Islamic inspired local legislation. 
This has attracted the attention of many researchers. The National Commission Against Violence 
Towards Women (Komisi Nasional anti-kekerasan terhadap Perempuan, Komnas Perempuan), 
for instance, has referred to Cianjur’s local legislation as one example of institutionalisation of 
discrimination against women in Indonesia.10 The local ‘syariah’ regulations were all issued by 
the former district head (bupati) of Cianjur, Wasidi Swastomo (bupati from 2001 to 2006), a 
member of  the secular Golkar party, but who made Islamisation (syariasasi) a mission of 
Cianjur’s government. At the very end of his term, this mission was enshrined in Local 
Regulation No 3 of 2006, which was adopted by Cianjur’s local parliament. Remarkably, the 
current (since 2006) district head Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh, who was backed by the orthodox 
Muslim party PKS and supports the existing syariah regulations, is yet to issue any new Islamic 
inspired local legislation.  
 
At a closer look, in practice the regulations mostly concern Muslim civil servants. For example, a 
dress code for civil servants makes wearing of a veil compulsory for Muslim female civil 
servants and long-sleeved batik shirts for males. Muslim civil servants are encouraged to pray 
five times a day and to improve their skills in reciting the Qur’an. However,, for the majority of 
the population, the Islamic policies of the local government do not seem to extend further than 
                                                 
6Calculation of figures from the table ‘Kepala keluarga menurut jenis kelamin, pekerjaan, dan perkawinan’ 
[Household heads according to sex, work and marital status] published on www.cianjurkab.go.id. 142,802 not 
working households divided by 594,323 (total households) multiplied with 100 percent equals 24  percent.  
7 The number of 24 percent not working households is including households of senior age and does not fully 
correspondent with unemployment figures. 
8 Laporan Tahunan Pengadilan Agama Cianjur [Annual reports of the Islamic Court of Cianjur] of 2006, 2007 and 
2008. In the alimony survey ‘economic reasons’ (23 percent) is the third mentioned reason for divorce, after ‘no fit 
anymore’ (62.5 percent) and ‘polygamy of the husband’ (38 percent).  ‘Domestic violence’ was mentioned by 10 
percent of the respondents. Multiple answers were possible. 
9 Santri are Muslim modernists who tend to be oriented towards the Qur'an and the tradition of the prophet 
Muhammad (Hadith) as opposed to abangan Muslim practices of syncretism.  
10 Komnas Perempuan 2009. 
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public billboards with slogans like ‘wearing a veil is a characteristic of a pious Muslim’ and other 
‘soft’ forms of persuasion . Both in the cities in Cianjur and in the villages, these government 
‘advices’ can be ignored without consequence, and a large portion of Muslim women still choose 
not to wear a veil, even when going to the Islamic Court. 
 
This is not to say that the Islamic normative system in Cianjur has only minor influence. On the 
contrary, Cianjur has 328 madrasah (Islamic day schools) and 67 pesantren  (Islamic boarding 
schools) from a total of 1819 schools in the district.11 These Islamic schools are led by local 
Islamic experts (kyai, uztad, ulama) who have considerable authority in their communities with 
regard to Islamic matters. In Cianjur, there is a great deal of variation in the religious affiliation 
of these Islamic boarding schools and their leaders. This means that there are many competing 
interpretations of Islamic law. In matters of marriage and divorce, the most conservative schools 
and leaders will reject state involvement altogether. More moderate schools and leaders recognize 
the role of the state in marital affairs, but often regard state divorce procedures too burdensome in 
terms of cost and effort. Many local religious actors (including marriage registrars, who are 
usually recruited from the pool of local Islamic experts) are willing to (re)marry people who have 
not divorced through the Islamic Court, and thus are not regarded as divorced according to 
national law. Qualitative and quantitative data indicates that these local religious actors are 
enabling men to engage in polygamous marriages, which according to state law is only allowed 
with the permission of the Islamic Court.12 The Islamic Court of Cianjur seldom gives such 
permission.13 Yet, more than one-third of the divorcees (42 out of 120) in the alimony survey 
mentioned a polygamous marriage by the husband as a reason for seeking a divorce. 
 
The strong position of Islam and Islamic religious figures within the community indicates that the 
alternative normative system provided by Islam is strongly embedded in Cianjur’s society. 
Indeed, existing research indicates that the Islamic normative system is widely accepted 
throughout Indonesia as an alternative forum to state institutions for dealing with marital 
affairs.14 The question is whether the Islamic system also functions as an alternative forum for 
female justice seekers to successfully seek redress where their alimony rights are denied. 
 
Young marriage  
The marriage age of Sundanese women has traditionally been among the youngest in Indonesia, 
and the divorce rates have been high.15 It is highly probable that the two are correlated, since 
international research has shown that marrying young is one of the main predictors of early 
divorce.16 Since the 1970s, the average age of marriage in West Java has been slowly increasing, 
                                                 
11 Figures from http://schomap.ditpsmk.net/schomap/report.php?Rep=tsissmksemuamts&IdKabR=0205. 
12 Marriage Law No 1 of 1974, Article 5. 
13 In total, eight times for the years 2006 - 2008. Polygamous relations I encountered in Cianjur usually concerned 
men secretly (without the first wife’s knowledge) marrying another woman. According to Indonesian law, these 
marriages cannot be registered, but in practice people can obtain forged marriage certificates through the Office of 
Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA).  
14 E.g. Cammack, Mark E., Donovan, Helen and Heaton, Tim B 2007; Euis Nurlealawati 2007. 
15 See Gavin W. Jones 2001.  
16 Lynn K. White 1990 gives a summary of researches that prove this: ‘Early marriage increases the chances of 
divorce (cf. Balakrishnan et al. 1987; South and Spitze, 1986; Thornton and Rodgers 1987). In fact, Martin and 
Bumpass (1989) conclude that age at marriage is the strongest predictor of divorce in the first five years of marriage. 
Moore and Waite (1981) find that this effect is independent of early childbearing.’ Philip Quest  finds the same 
correlation between marrying young and early divorce for Indonesia (Guest, P. 1992: 95). 
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while divorce rates have declined.17 
 
However, in Cianjur, most women still marry young. According to the most recent data, the 
average age that women first get married in Cianjur is 18.3 years.18 Other research suggests a 
much lower figure for women’s first marriage in Cianjur – 17 years – and indicates that the 
number of women marrying below the legal age of marriage (16 years) is the highest in West 
Java.19 Many more couples marry before the woman reaches the age of 16, but wait until she has 
turned 16 before registering the marriage, and therefore aren’t counted in official statistics. 
Women are traditionally encouraged or forced to marry young to prevent extramarital pregnancy 
and sin (zina). However, arranged marriages have recently become less common, and (first) 
marriage is now ideally based on romantic love and preceded by courtship (pacaran).20 After 
marriage, teenage couples will first reside with the wife’s parents, only leaving when they are 
capable or mature enough to live on their own. They will then form a nuclear family, the most 
common living arrangement in Sundanese society. 
 
Most people don’t divorce at the Islamic Court  
In Sundanese culture, there is strong and widespread belief in the existence of a predestined 
partner (jodoh). In practice, this means that if a marriage does not work out, the conclusion is 
often that the people involved have simply not yet found their jodoh. It is this belief that makes 
divorce socially acceptable.21 According to official statistics from the Islamic Court of Cianjur 
for 2007, 21,744 couples registered their marriages and 445 filed for divorce.22  This amounts to 
a divorce rate of 2 percent. However, the alimony survey indicates around 80 percent of the
interviewed divorced women who registered their marriage in Cianjur divorced unofficially or 
outside court. The bulk of divorces therefore don’t appear in the official statistics. It is arguable, 
then, that the actual divorce rate for Cianjur should be set five times higher than the official rate 
of 2 percent, at 10 percent. This is in line with the national divorce rate for Muslims of 10 
percent.
 
                                                
23 
 
Although state law stipulates that all divorces must be brought to court, the people concerned and 
the communities in which they live consider these out of court divorces to be legal according to 
their religion. The state, however, does not recognize these divorces.24 As a result, women who 
divorce out of court are unable to seek enforcement of their post-divorce rights – including 
 
17 Jones, Gavin W., Yahya Asari and Tuti Djuartika 1994. 
18 Komnas Perempuan 2009.  
19 Survei Sosial Ekonomi Daerah 2005 shows that Cianjur has the highest number of underage marriages in West 
Java. Source:  http://www.bapeda-jabar.go.id/docs/publikasi_data/20080408_163140.pdf 
20 In West Java courtship is common practice for girls at Islamic boarding schools (Dwi Rubiyanti Kholifah 2005). 
21 Jones, Gavin W., Yahya Asari and Tuti Djuartika 1994. 
22 Laporan Tahunan 2007 Pengadilan Agama Cianjur [Annual Report 2007 of the Islamic Court of Cianjur]. 
23 In 2008 there were around 200,000 (Islamic Court registered) divorces and 2 million Muslim (KUA registered) 
marriages (The Jakarta Post ‘Divorce rate up 10 fold in reform era’, April 2 2009. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/04/divorce-rate-10-fold-reform-era-ministry.html). According to the 
alimony survey the official divorce rate of Cianjur would increase five-fold if all Muslim divorces were done at the 
Islamic Court.  This suggests that any increase of the divorce rate in Indonesia could in part be attributed to an 
increased willingness of Muslims (especially women) to divorce at the Islamic Court. Thus, an increase in the 
number of divorce certificates issued does not necessarily mean an increase in actual divorces taking place. 
24 This can give rise to the strange situation where most divorced women and men in Cianjur are officially still 
married, and in some cases that remarried couples are not officially married to each other but to their former spouses. 
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alimony rights for themselves and their children – at the Islamic Court. The question is whether 
there is an alternative forum available to these women. 
 
Out of court divorce is usually referred to as ‘religious divorce’ – a term that presumes that these 
unofficial divorces are conducted in accordance with Islamic law. In theory, a divorce proceeding 
according to Islamic norms would involve a talak  repudiation by the husband or a returning of 
the dowry (khuluk divorce, also called tebus cerai) initiated by the wife,25 respectively followed 
or proceeded by attempts by both families to achieve a reconciliation and rejuvenation of the 
marriage (rujuk). If this is not possible, financial duties such as child alimony and spousal 
alimony would be negotiated. By contrast, interviews with village-level marriage registrars (amil 
desa) indicate that in many cases women are simply abandoned or returned to their parents 
without further financial arrangements being made. The alimony survey indicates that only 30 
percent of the out of court divorces  involved agreements regarding child alimony. Only 23 
percent of the cases involved an agreement regarding the wife’s financial rights. At least half26 of 
out of court divorces  proceed without financial arrangement for wife or children. Thus, one 
could question the extent to which the Islamic rules regarding alimony are embedded in Cianjur. 
More importantly, non-payment of alimony could place women and their children on the poverty 
line.  
There are few alimony cases brought before the Islamic Court of Cianjur. None of the listed cases 
involved only an alimony claim. In 2007, 27 (6 percent) out of the 445 divorce cases included a 
request for a court-decision on alimony as part of the divorce case and due to six withdrawals 
only 21 court decisions regarding alimony were made.27 This is rather surprising, given that 
requests for spousal alimony and child alimony can be included in the claim or counterclaim 
without the need to seek an extra court session or pay additional court fees. The question is why 
most women do not make use of this legal opportunity.  
 
Table 1. Percentage of alimony agreements of total divorces 
 
 Out of court (alimony survey 
2009) 
Included in Islamic 
Court decisions (2007) 
Child alimony  30 % 2.7 %  
Spousal alimony 23 % 2.7 % 
 
Back to the parents 
In Cianjur, it is rare for a household to be headed by a divorced woman. Cianjur’s population 
consists of 594,323 registered households, of which 10 percent are headed by females.28 These 
female headed households are usually households in which the husband has passed away. A study 
at the village administration of Babakan Karet in Cianjur suggested that only about 10 percent of 
                                                 
25 In practice, many women think that if they want a divorce they have to convince their husband to divorce them by 
asking them to pronounce the talak. One way to do that is by ‘buying’ a divorce. This perception of the khuluk 
(returning of the dowry) as a sale rather than a legal right means that sometimes the amount of money that is 
demanded by the husbands is much higher than the price of the dowry. 
26 The figure from the alimony survey is relatively uncertain because a large percentage of the 120 women did not 
answer these particular questions. Agreement on spousal financial rights: ‘Yes’ 23 percent; ‘No’ 58 percent, ‘No 
answer’ 19 percent. Agreement on child alimony: ‘Yes’ 30 percent; ‘No’ 52 percent; ‘No answer’ 18 percent. 
27 Author’s analysis of Register Pengadilan Agama Cianjur 2007.  
28 Population statistics of Cianjur for 2007 obtained from www.cianjurkab.go.id. 
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these female household heads (thus involving about 1 percent of all households) are divorcees. It 
appears, then, that most divorced women find refuge elsewhere. 
 
One explanation for this is that in Sundanese culture, divorced women and their children are 
usually returned to the woman’s parents by their husbands after pronouncement of the talak.29 
These women are supported by their parents, and if they work they contribute to the income of 
their parents’ household. Research by Schröder-Butterfill has shown the importance of this 
support provided by parents to their adult children. She concludes that ‘in the majority of cases, 
the net flow of inter-generational support is either downwards – from old to young – or 
balanced’.30 
 
In this way, the financial consequences of a divorce can be minimized. In Cianjur, if the divorced 
woman is young, the children are often cared for by the grandparents on the mother’s side, whilst 
the divorced woman seeks work. Many of these divorceed women become migrant workers 
abroad (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia).31 Many others remarry, as in Sundanese culture remarriage is 
easy and socially accepted 
In short, there are safety nets available for divorced women in Cianjur. The question is whether 
these safety nets are sufficient to avoid divorced women falling into poverty, and to prevent the 
negative effects of a divorce in terms of income more broadly. To put it more bluntly: is alimony 
really needed? 
 
3. Cianjur’s divorcees and their experiences with alimony 
Below I will outline the characteristics of the divorced mothers who were interviewed for the 
alimony survey. These 120 women were selected through targeting sampling32 in three sub-
districts (kecamatan) in Cianjur: the district capital Cianjur; Cipanas in the north and Pagelaran in 
the South. 
 
All these women are considered by themselves and their communities as being divorced. All have 
children. This paper highlights the differences between women in Cianjur who went to the 
Islamic Court (17 women or 14 percent) and those who chose to divorce out of court (103 women 
or 86 percent). I ask the question: are differences in education, income, age of marriage, etc 
indicators that determine the likelihood that women will divorce at the Islamic Court?  
 
Next, I link the satisfaction of the divorcees concerning the payment of child alimony by their 
former husbands to the economic situation of the divorcees after the divorce. The question is how 
the economic situation of these women changed after a divorce, whether the safety nets provided 
by the family are sufficient for these divorced women, and whether they need alimony? 
 
Educational background 
Many of the women divorced out of court have only received basic education. Divorcees who 
went to the Islamic Court are on average better educated. Sixty three percent of the out of court 
                                                 
29 See Euis Nurlaelawati 2007. 
30 Schröder-Butterfill, E. 2004:497. 
31 Focus group discussion with village-level amil at the KUA of sub-distirct (kecamatan) Cianjur 24 – 5 2009.  
32 In contrast to the representative sampling method , in which a representative sample of the population is 
interviewed, in the targeted sampling method only a sample of the group that is subject of research is interviewed.  
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divorcees had received only primary school education, against 35 percent of the Islamic Court 
respondents. The latter have all at least finished primary school, against 20 percent of out of court 
divorcees that had not. Looking at women who finished senior high school or higher education, 
the figures are 41 percent for Islamic Court respondents against 17 percent of out of court 
respondents. Thus, the level of education seems to be one of the key factors that determines 
whether women will divorce at the Islamic Court. 
 
Figure 3. Educational background of the respondent 
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Occupation 
Official statistics state that 40 percent of the women in Cianjur work. In the alimony survey, the 
unemployment figure for divorced women is somewhat different. Of the 120 surveyed out of 
court divorcees, 46 percent considered themselves to be housewives or unemployed. The rest, 54 
percent, see themselves as employed. Most of these working women work as small entrepreneurs 
(24 percent), while 18 percent are farmers, and one percent are civil servants. The other 46 
percent seem to be dependent upon family members for their income. As mentioned above, in 
many cases married couples largely depend upon their parents as their main source of income. 
Couples often marry in their teens, before they have a stable income, and therefore stay with one 
of their parents – usually the wife’s parents-  until they are able to start a nuclear family of their 
own. 
 
If women who went to the Islamic Court are singled out, the main differences are the relatively 
low number of farmers (6 percent compared to 18 percent for others) and the relatively high 
number of civil servants (12 percent compared to 1 percent). A comparable percentage of women 
in this group are also housewives or unemployed, and thus not economically independent. It 
therefore seems that economic independence is not the main factor that determines whether 
women go to the Islamic Court.  
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Figure 4. Occupation of the respondent 
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Income 
Looking at income, it becomes clear that in Cianjur, a woman’s income level influences the 
likelihood that she will go to court for her divorce.  Only 20 percent of out of court divorcees had 
an income higher than Rp 500,000, whereas 41 percent of divorcees who went to court had 
incomes above this level. This means that poverty makes it less likely for a woman to seek an 
official divorce at court. The poorest group are women who are the heads of their households, 
which can be explained by the fact they have to run a household alone. 
 
Importantly, almost all of the women who file a request for a court decision on child alimony 
have husbands who  fall within higher income groups, while only a few fall into the lowest 
income group.33 It seems that lower income couples who seek a divorce at the  Islamic Court file 
for divorce only, and do not exercise their right to seek a decision on alimony. For this reason, the 
author has broadened the focus of this case study to include informal  alimony and child support 
practices. 
 
Figure 5. Respondent’s monthly income (1000s of Rupiah) 
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33 Data regarding the husband’s income was not available from the Islamic Court of Cianjur.  However, the amount 
of alimony requested – in almost all cases more than Rp 500,000 per month – indicates that the husband’s income is 
also above Rp 500,000.  Judges are required to (and do) consider income level when making decisions on alimony. 
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Young marriage 
As mentioned, the average age of marriage for women in Cianjur according to the latest official 
data is 18.3. However, the average age of first marriage for the women who participated in the 
alimony survey was far younger, just 17 years. This is more in line with older statistics for 
Cianjur.34 This difference can be explained by the fact that the alimony survey only involved 
divorced women. As previously noted, those who marry young more often end up in divorce than 
those who marry at a more mature age. Another explanation is that the alimony survey includes 
unregistered marriages, while the official Komnas Perempuan statistics do not. A marriage that is 
concluded at an unlawful age (below 16 years) cannot be registered without prior court 
permission. For the years 2006 to 2008, the Islamic Court of Cianjur did not handle any 
permission for underage marriage cases. In the alimony survey, 20 percent of the out of court 
divorcees were married at the age of 15 or younger. If these underage marriages were not 
included in the figure, the average age of first marriage would be much higher. 
 
Figure 6. The age of first marriage 
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Children 
The sample group for the alimony survey consisted of  divorcees who have children. These 
divorced women have an average of 2.4 children each, and given that children usually stay with 
the mother, hypothetically, female divorcees are  responsible for 3.4 persons (including 
themselves). As Figure 5 shows, around 80 percent of the divorced women in Cianjur have 
incomes of less than Rp 500,000. This places these households below the poverty line. In 2008, 
the poverty line for rural West Java was set at Rp 155,367 per capita. The average household of a 
divorced woman with children therefore needs an income of more than Rp 528,000 (Rp 155,367 
multiplied by 3.4 persons) in order to live above the poverty line.  
 
For these women and their children, divorce means running the risk of impoverishment. 
Returning to the parents is therefore not only a cultural habit, but for many divorced women also 
an economic necessity. For these women, an additional contribution to their income, for instance 
in the form of child alimony, would be a significant  improvement. 
                                                 
34 In the 2005 social-economic survey conducted by the National  Statistics Agency BPS (in which unregistered 
marriages were included), the mean age at which women in Cianjur first marry was 17 years, while 29.7 percent of 
first time marriages involved women below the lawful age of 16 (Survey Sosial Ekonomi Daerah 2005). 
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4. Is non- payment of alimony conceived of as an injustice? 
The fact that few alimony arrangements are made after divorce might lead one to question 
whether alimony rules are embedded in society and whether women in Cianjur  know that they 
are entitled to receive alimony. Surprisingly, the answer to the latter is yes, they do. 
 
More than 90 percent of women state that a husband should pay spousal alimony, and more than 
95 percent state that a husband should pay child alimony. Women in Cianjur do feel that the fact 
that an ex-husband is not paying alimony is an injustice. This could be seen as an awareness 
amongst these women of their rights to alimony.  However, these women appear to regard non-
payment, irregular payment or under-payment of alimony as a religious matter – constituting a 
sin (dosa) – rather than in terms of legal rights.  
 
In most cases, the former husband’s contribution to the children’s upbringing is irregular or 
absent.  Consequently, there is high dissatisfaction among women who divorced out of court 
regarding the former husband’s contributions (69 percent dissatisfied compared to 7 percent 
satisfied).  Women who are the heads of their households are more dissatisfied (81 percent 
dissatisfied compared to 4 percent satisfied) and most often very dissatisfied. This can be 
explained by the fact that women running a household alone and without support from their 
parents have a greater need for alimony payments. 
 
Remarkably, the most dissatisfied group consists of women who went to the Islamic Court (83 
percent dissatisfied compared to 0 percent satisfied). An explanation could be that they expected 
going to court would be an effective guarantee of alimony. However, this explanation is 
unsatisfactory, because few women file an alimony claim in the court. Another explanation may 
be that women who go to court generally have a background of higher income levels, and they 
therefore expect more from their former husbands. 
 
Figure 7. Satisfaction rate concerning child support by former husband 
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Economic consequences 
One of the most important outcomes of the alimony survey is the revelation that in most cases a 
divorce does not appear to have major economic consequences for the woman involved. Thirty 
nine percent of the divorced women (including both those officially and unofficially divorced) 
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stated that there was no change in their economic position, 27 percent that their economic 
position was worse and 26 percent that their economic position was better than before. There 
were no big differences between women who went to court and those who did not. 
 
Support from family is a major explanation for the unchanged or even improved position of most 
divorcees. Another explanation mentioned in interviews is that the husband's contribution to the 
household economy was so poor that divorce did not have a significant impact. Indeed, in such 
cases, the absence of the husband means one mouth less to feed. Moreover, as mentioned before, 
more than half of the divorced women work and thus have their own income.  
 
Figure 8. Economical situation after the divorce 
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These facts give rise to the question of whether the perceived injustice of not receiving child 
support from the ex-husband should always be considered a real life problem. Apart from the 
religious or ethical aspect of alimony payments as a duty of the father, most divorced women 
seem capable of taking care of themselves and their children in economic terms, albeit with help 
from their parents. 
 
 
5. Non-payment of child support: blaming, but no claiming 
Most divorced women in Cianjur are dissatisfied with their former husband's contribution to their 
child’s upbringing. The main grievance is that ex-husbands don't fulfill their religious duty to pay 
child support. In some cases, the grievance is more specific: that ex-husbands don’t carry out 
agreed informal arrangements (30 percent of out of court divorces involve such an arrangement) 
or court decisions (3 percent of  divorces at the Islamic Court include such a decision) regarding 
child alimony. Other than politely asking for the contribution, women rarely take further action to 
improve the situation. 
 
Although the non-payment of child  alimony is seen as an injustice, most women feel that it does 
not affect their economic position. Women are able to provide for their children themselves. As a 
result, not much effort is put towards resolving the perceived injustice.  
 
The annual reports of the Islamic Court of Cianjur for 2006, 2007 and 2008 record no specific 
alimony cases. This means that not a single woman in Cianjur brought a grievance regarding the 
non-execution of a court decision on alimony to court. 
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As a result, men are able to get away with non-payment of child alimony, without having to face 
any legal (or non-legal) consequences. In many cases, the former husband did not have sufficient 
income anyway – as noted, this is a major reason for divorce in Cianjur. In these cases, women 
often don’t expect the husband to contribute too much towards the upbringing of the child. More 
than 90 percent of the women who decide to go to court only seek a divorce certificate, which 
allows them to remarry according to national laws, and do not seek any decision on alimony. 
 
Apparently, women strongly feel that former husbands should pay child alimony, but only 
express this view in terms of religious sin, and do not take legal action. Many men feel that they 
don't have to pay if they don’t have the means, or if they are remarried and therefore have 
responsibility for a new family. They do not seem particularly worried about the consequences of 
committing a religious sin. As one man put it: ‘akhirat datang belakangan’ or ‘the afterlife is a 
concern for later’. 
 
Box 2. Property vs child alimony 
 
This case study focuses on alimony cases only. However, the interviews clearly show that other 
forms of financial security, especially joint marital property (harta bersama) and individual  
property (harta bawaan) are of similar importance. Some of the interviewed women not only 
experienced non-payment of child alimony but also experienced problems with the execution of 
decisions or arrangements regarding joint marital property.  These women would highlight these 
problems, and hardly complain about their ex-husbands’ non-payment of child alimony. In those 
cases, I, as the interviewer, had to make an effort to bring the conversation back to the subject of 
child alimony, in order to ensure all questions were asked. Although not the subject of this case 
study, and thus not thoroughly examined, I feel that some words should be devoted to the issue of 
marital and individual property, given that they are one of the most important forms of financial 
security for women responsible for the upkeep of a household. 
 
Generally speaking, child alimony payments are so low in practice (usually much lower than the 
Rp 500,000 per month typically awarded by the Islamic Court) that they can only contribute a 
portion of the actual costs of a child’s upbringing. As noted, many women feel that they are 
capable of providing the day-to-day needs of their children independently of their ex-husbands. 
However, what women fear is unexpected high costs in the future.  One woman explained: ‘If the 
father does not want to pay such a small amount of money now, what if I have to meet high costs 
in the future, like if my child has to be hospitalised?’ Women who have property can rely upon 
this property as insurance for such unexpected costs. 
  
Furthermore, mothers of young children fear the future costs of education. Again, property can be 
put towards a child’s educational costs. Perhaps for these reasons, my impression is that women 
are more willing to take action to protect their property rights than to seek redress for non-
payment of child alimony issues.  
 
One woman in the sub-district Cugenang, who could not afford a lawyer, successfully defended 
her child alimony and joint marital property claims herself at the Islamic Court of Cianjur. She 
had gathered all necessary proof relating to the joint property, which consisted of bank savings, 
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rice fields, and a house. All of the property was registered in her husband’s name.  When he did 
not hand over the property voluntarily, she went to the police. One of the problems this woman 
encountered was that she had no idea what legal steps to take after her case was decided by the 
court. The property therefore remained in her ex-husband’s hands, and she was forced  to 
renegotiate all her property rights again with her husband. She used the police officer to pressure 
her husband in these negotiations, rather than to seek enforcement of the court decision. The issue 
of child alimony did not come into the discussions. When I asked her about child alimony, she 
instead talked about her property: ‘I know he has the money, since his other children are going to 
junior high school (the former husband is responsible for three other children from his first 
marriage). I can take care of her (pointing at her daughter) myself while she is still young. But 
what about when she gets older? That is what I need the savings for.’ 
 
 
6. Intermediaries  
 
Here, the focus shifts from the barriers faced by justice seekers, to the people and/or institutions 
who may refer justice seekers to the Islamic Court. These intermediaries influence the awareness 
amongst justice seekers regarding rights, procedures and costs of a divorce case at the Islamic 
Court. 
  
In Cianjur, the most frequently cited source of information concerning the Islamic Court is 
family, followed by the village administration and the Office of Religious Affairs (Kantor 
Urusan Agama, KUA).  NGOs are only prominent in the area of Cipanas because of the activities 
of the NGO PEKKA (see below). Lawyers were not mentioned at all, and in the cases I observed 
at the Islamic Court of Cianjur, professional legal representation was rare. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Source of information concerning divorce at the Islamic Court 
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Family  
Sixty five percent of respondents stated that family is the forum in which marital problems are 
discussed, and 53 percent of respondents who went to the Islamic Court cited family as the 
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source for legal information. On the negative side, respondents also noted that family members 
are the most likely parties to discourage couples from seeking an official resolution to marital 
problems, and the most likely to encourage women to divorce out of court. Accordingly, the 
experiences and perceptions of family members with regard to the Islamic Court would appear to 
be an important factor in determining whether a party will go to court. 
 
Before a divorce is brought to the Islamic Court, family members on both sides will generally 
already tried (unsuccessfully) to reconcile the spouses. In the court process, family members are 
usually brought into court as witnesses. In many cases, an educated family member will also 
represent the case before the court. Unfortunately some of these educated family members have 
just as little knowledge of substantive and procedural rules as most other litigants do and they 
depend just as much on the advices by the Islamic Court as many other clients do.  
 
After a divorce has taken place any further contact between the former spouses is often via 
family members. When the father visits or meet his children he will give them some money, 
usually just pocket money. Interviews indicate that higher amounts of child support most often is 
handed over to the grandparents. However, in the approximately half of cases in which the father 
does not want to pay any child alimony,35 neither the grandparents nor any other family member 
are able to convince him otherwise. 
 
Village apparatus 
The amil, responsible for family affairs in the village administration, is an important figure with 
regard to providing information on marital affairs. Officially, these amil are the lowest 
representative of the KUA (see below) and its marriage counseling office,36 but they hold office 
in the kantor desa. These amil are junior marriage registrars (Pembantu Pegawai Pencatat Nikah, 
P3N), and are usually recruited from the ranks of the village level Islamic experts (kyai, uztad).  
Potentially, these amil can play an important role in bridging the gap between the state normative 
system and the religious normative system, and provide the community with legal information on 
divorce matters. Unfortunately, many people state that these amil arrange forged marriage 
certificates and ask large amounts of money for assisting in the arrangement of divorces at the 
Islamic Court. Their position, as the link between the KUA and the village, is also in this respect 
a strategic one. It is reported that some amil overstate the procedural costs charged by the Islamic 
Court in order to encourage out of court divorces, from which they benefit through charging for 
forged marriage certificates. 
 
During a focus group discussion, I asked whether amil play a role in alimony disputes. The 
                                                 
35 The alimony survey uses a scale from ‘always’, ‘regularly’, ‘quite regularly’, ‘seldom’, to ‘never’. I give the ‘quite 
regular’ against the ‘seldom’ figures here, since most women filled in these options.  44 percent (against 43 percent 
seldom) of the ex-husbands quite regularly give pocket money to their children; 43 percent (against 49 percent 
seldom) quite regularly give money for their children’s education; and 51 percent (against 41 percent seldom) quite 
regularly give money for their children’s daily needs. If the answers ‘regularly’ and ‘always’ are counted, in total 
more than 50 percent of ex-husbands at least quite regularly provide support for the children’s upbringing. However, 
according to most women, the amount of support is not satisfactory. 
36 This office, which is known by its abbreviation BP4, changed its name (but not its abbreviation) in 2008 to the 
Office for Marriage Counseling, Development and Safeguarding (Badan Penasihatan, Pembinaan dan Pelestarian 
Perkawinan). The former name, the Office for Marriage Counseling and Divorce Settlements (Badan Penasihatan 
Perkawinan dan Penyelesaian Perceraian), was considered to be no longer in line with its jurisdiction, as divorces 
since the Marriage law of 1974 are in fact handled by the Islamic Court. 
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gathered amil (of 16 villages in Karangtengah sub-district) said they do play a role, namely 
responding to complaints made by female divorcees by pointing out to the husband his moral 
duty to pay alimony. However, if this moral pressure fails to convince the husband, the lack of 
legal sanctions for non-payment leaves no other option for enforcing the woman’s alimony 
rights. 
 
The unsalaried neighbourhood heads (kepala RT), who as the heads of Indonesia’s smallest 
administrative divisions are closer to the community, are noted as another source for information 
regarding the Islamic Court. In some cases, one of the spouses or ex-spouses will approach the 
kepala RT for assistance in mediating a marital conflict, and divorced women sometimes 
complain to the kepala RT about unsatisfactory alimony payments.  Sometimes the kepala RT 
will confront the father in response to these complaints. 
   
The Islamic Court of Cianjur appears to regard a kepala RT  as a reliable witness.  Typically, the 
litigants are asked to bring two witnesses: a family member and the kepala RT. Accordingly, the 
kepala RT often acts as witness for one of the parties in divorce cases. In this way the kepala RT  
bring knowledge gained from these experiences with the Islamic Court back to the local 
community. 
 
Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA (Office of Religious Affairs) 
The KUA, which has an office in each sub-district, is responsible for religious affairs – including 
marital affairs. Many couples who want to divorce go to the local KUA first, assuming that the 
place at which marriages are registered is also the place to arrange a divorce. If  a couple decides 
to go to the KUA, the KUA will send the couple to marriage counseling (BP4). If this proves 
unsuccessful, the KUA is obliged to refer the couple to the Islamic Court, where they can file for 
divorce. However, the KUA does not always do this. In some cases, divorce at the Islamic Court 
is simply not possible because the couple’s marriage was never registered. In other cases, it 
appears that KUA officials have a vested interest in not providing the right information. 
 
Qualitative data – from interviews with KUA personnel, advocates, judges and Islamic Court 
personnel – suggests that some people within the KUA arrange middlemen (calo) who, for a fee, 
will arrange most of the paperwork for the litigants. This could explain why many people believe 
the procedural costs to be higher than they actually are. Indeed, many people end up paying these 
exaggerated costs.  According to sources within the Islamic Court of Cianjur, the KUA refuses to 
make public the official procedural costs, which allows them to overcharge. ‘If we sent them a 
poster with procedural costs they will not put it on their wall.’37 Sources within the KUA 
acknowledge the problems, but argue that the situation has improved over the years and that the 
KUA’s poor image is based on its past practices. The Head of the Cugenang KUA says that KUA 
now takes a more cooperative approach towards the Islamic Court.38 According to Islamic Court 
sources, some offices have demonstrated major progress, but in many others change is difficult to 
achieve. In fact, for many people living in remote areas, a corrupt KUA actually provides a good 
alternative to the Islamic Court, because it allows a party to obtain all the required documents 
more easily and closer to home.39 
                                                 
37 Private conversation with an assistant-clerk (panitera muda) of the Islamic court of Cianjur, 14 12 2008. 
38 Interview with head of KUA of the sub-district Cugenang March 17, 2009. 
39 As is the case in the remote sub-district of Nangringgul (See Tirtawening Parekesit’s case study). 
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Personnel of the Islamic Court 
Personnel of the Islamic Court are a source of information for the people in the communities in 
which they live, and are often consulted on marital and other issues. In some cases, court 
personnel will ask for a small amount of ‘typing money’ in return for writing a person’s claim or 
counterclaim in their private time. Although this would appear to be a conflict of  interest, since 
the same people are also involved in handling the case, I found no evidence suggesting that the 
court’s decisions are influenced by this dual role performed by court personnel. 
 
In particular, court clerks (panitera) and their assistants (panitera muda) play a vital role, as they 
are responsible for registering the divorce request or suit, and in doing so they ask parties what 
they want to include in their claim or counterclaim. It is these officers who could inform parties 
of their right to file for alimony as part of a divorce case, although interviews indicate that they 
do not always do so. Many women who might wish to make a claim for alimony may fail to do 
so if they are unaware of this right.40  
 
NGOs 
There are several NGOs active in the field of women rights in Cianjur. However, most of them 
are preoccupied with issues such as human trafficking and domestic violence rather than marital 
affairs. In general, women in Cianjur do not refer to NGOs as source of information in this 
regard. 
 
The one exception is PEKKA, a NGO that in Cianjur works with female household heads in the 
northern area near the towns of  Cipanas and Pacet , and which in those areas is often noted as 
source of legal information. This NGO seems to be successful in increasing women’s legal 
knowledge and offering assistance in formulating women’s applications for free of charge (pro 
deo) divorce at the Islamic Court of Cianjur. However, PEKKA’s current focus is on helping 
poor women gain access to official documentation through both pro deo registration of 
unregistered marriages, and pro deo divorces at the Islamic Court of Cianjur. Alimony is less of a 
concern. PEKKA’s strategy is to empower women and help them to become economically 
independent. The latter strategy is for instance reflected in projects that encourage divorced 
women and widows to set up small cooperatives.  
 
Lawyers 
In most cases, people choose not to be represented by a lawyer. If there is representation, it is 
usually by a family member. The cost factor plays a role in this. Allegedly, lawyers ask for 
around Rp 3.5 million to represent a party in a divorce case. When the amount of money at stake 
is only a few million, it would not make sense to pay such a high price for legal representation. 
 
Lawyers are able to ensure the court process runs smoothly, as they are familiar with the 
procedures. As a consequence, the Islamic Court tends to (or is able to) adhere more closely to 
procedure in cases where a party is represented by a lawyer, as judges do not need to consider the 
lack of knowledge of the represented party. Evidence, claims and counterclaims are submitted in 
                                                 
40 At the time of writing, a second amendment on the law concerning Islamic Courts has passed through Parliament, 
which requires that there be a free legal aid office in each Islamic Court (Article 60(c) of Law No 50 of 2009)). This 
legal aid office could take over the current role of the panitera in the Islamic Court.   
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the proper order, and witnesses called at the appropriate time. 
 
Some lawyers seem to have good contacts within the Islamic Court of Cianjur. In at least one 
case, this led to ‘illegitimate flexibility’, where a case that should have been handled in Bandung 
was filed for and accepted in Cianjur. According to one lawyer, a lawyer with good contacts 
within the court can also arrange for a case to be heard earlier.  
 
With regard to the non-payment of alimony orders there was one lawyer who said that she would 
like to find a client who was willing to bring her case to court to get the alimony order enforced 
According to her the Islamic court should first issue a court warning and if the husband would 
still not pay she would bring the case to the civil court. Such test cases are yet lacking and 
therefore lawyers could play a role in developing proper legal mechanisms of enforcement. 
 
7. State law on alimony  
In this part I discuss the national Islamic rules of relevance to alimony cases. As previously 
noted, most women in Cianjur who undergo a divorce do not come before the Islamic Court as 
required by national law, and therefore are unable to enforce their post-divorce rights as laid 
down in national Islamic law. However, there is little difference between traditional syafi’ite 
Islamic jurisprudence41 and Indonesia’s national laws regarding alimony. Like syafi’ite law, 
Indonesian national Islamic law differentiates between divorces initiated by men (talak divorce) 
and those initiated by women (gugat cerai). In both contexts, spousal alimony rights differ 
greatly depending on who initiates the divorce. 
  
 
Box  3. Relevant legislation 
• Marriage law No 1 of 1974 
• Government Regulation No 9 of 1975 
• Compilation of Islamic Law 1991 (Kompilasi Hukum Islam, KHI)  
• Law No 7 of 1989 (as amended by No 3 2006 and No 50 2009) regarding the Islamic 
Court. 
• Herziene Indonesische Reglement 1941 (procedural law) 
• Government Regulation No 10 of 1983 as amended by No 45 of 1990 regarding 
permission to marry and divorce for civil servants 
• Fiqh (Islamic law, included because it is still referred to in court decisions)  
 
Husband initiated (talak) divorce and spousal alimony 
A husband who wants to initiate an official registered divorce first goes to the court and asks for 
permission to divorce. The wife than can object or list spousal and child alimony claims. 
Subsequently the court grants or does not grant permission for divorce and if it does it will also 
decide on the wife’s counterclaim. If the husband is granted permission he can ‘declare’ (ikrar) 
the talak before court, and only after he has done so does the divorce take effect. 
 
                                                 
41 Indonesian Muslims traditionally followed the syafi’ite school of Islamic jurisprudence. 
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If the husband has declared the talak (and provided he has not already done so two times in this 
marriage) the divorce is called talak raj’i and still can be reconciled (rujuk) in the waiting period 
of three months (masa iddah) in which the wife may not remarry, notwithstanding that the 
husband has not remarried.42 In the three month waiting period, the husband must provide nafkah 
iddah (maintenance), kiswah (clothing) and maskan (housing) for his former wife, except where 
she is proven to have been disobedient (nusyuz)43 In case of talak raj’i  the husband is also 
obliged (wajib) to provide nafkah mut’ah (gift of consolation; compensation).44 In the case of a 
third declaration of the talak within the same marriage (talak ba’in) nafkah mut’ah is only a 
recommended act45 and all other spousal alimony rights will lapse.  
 
If the Islamic Court accepts a request for permission to pronounce the talak, the husband is then 
entitled to do so. However, this does not mean the divorce is immediately effective.  The husband 
could still decide not to declare the talak (ikrar talak). The ikrar talak must be executed in court 
before it becomes valid.46 If the husband decides not to pronounce the talak at the Islamic Court, 
the case will expire after six months.47 As is shown below, a husband may elect not to pronounce 
the talak for financial reasons, namely where the court has granted a request by the wife for 
spousal alimony. 
 
Wife initiated divorce (gugat cerai) and spousal alimony 
If the wife initiates the divorce it is the court that issues the talak. Furthermore, in these divorces 
the wife has no right to any form of spousal alimony as the legal status of such a divorce is talak 
ba’in sugrhaa, which is the equivalent of a third utterance of the talak, and cannot be followed by 
rujuk.48  The national rules on spousal alimony prescribed in the KHI closely follow procedure of 
the traditional Islamic syiqaq divorce and the following text of the Qur’an  (An-Nasa’i): ‘Women 
that have the right to alimony and housing are those who the husband can take back (rujuk)’.  
 
Child alimony 
Custody of a child below the age of 12 years is generally granted to the mother. If, at the time of 
divorce, the child is 12 years or older, he or she may choose with whom they want to live.49 
According to state law, the father remains responsible after the divorce for all costs related to the 
upbringing and education of the child,50 and is obliged to pay child alimony until his children 
reach the age of 21 years.51 
 
Traditional Islamic jurisprudence also provides for child alimony, and a father remains 
responsible for his children with a former wife. However, if the mother and children have enough 
resources of their own, or where the wife remarries, the father is excused from this duty. 
 
                                                 
42Kompilasi Hukum Islam (Compilation of Islamic Law) (KHI), article 163. 
43 KHI:149b. 
44 KHI:149a. 
45 KHI:159. 
46 KHI:131(3). 
47 KHI:131(4). 
48 KHI:119 and official explanation. 
49 KHI:105a-b. 
50 Marriage Law 1974:41b. 
51 KHI:149d and 156b. 
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One of the main differences between KHI and Islamic jurisprudence relates to the age beyond 
which the father is no longer required to pay child alimony. Different Islamic schools have 
different opinions about when the alimony obligation of the father ends, which turn upon 
differences in opinion as to when a child should be considered an adult or independent.52  
 
Jurisdiction of the Islamic Court in alimony conflicts 
The marriage law gives courts the power to establish an obligation for the former husband to his 
former wife.53 The Law regarding Islamic Courts allows a party to seek an order from the Islamic 
Court establishing the amount of spousal alimony and child alimony as part of a divorce case, as 
well as after a divorce is declared.54 The fact that alimony requests can be included in a divorce 
case means that no extra procedural costs are involved. 
 
The KHI gives the Islamic Court more specific jurisdiction regarding child alimony cases. The 
court decides conflicts regarding child alimony,55 and has jurisdiction to establish the amount of 
child alimony to be paid. In making this decision, the Court must consider the financial capacity 
of the father.56 
 
Civil servants 
I include non-Islamic government regulations for civil servants, because in practice Muslim civil 
servants have to divorce at the Islamic Court, and female civil servants or wives of civil servants 
submit requests for court decisions based on these regulations. Moreover, it is useful to compare 
legislation regarding alimony for civil servants with national Islamic legislation, as the former are 
clear and easy to implement. Civil servants fall under the government regulation regarding 
permission for marriage and divorce for civil servants.57 Divorce requires the permission of a 
superior. 
 
The regulations regarding civil servants contain provisions on both spousal and child alimony. If 
the husband initiates the divorce, the wife is entitled to one-third of the husband’s salary until she 
remarries. If the couple has children, another third of the husband’s salary will be withdrawn for 
child alimony. If the wife initiates the divorce, she has the right to child alimony, but has no right 
to spousal alimony unless her husband cheated on her.58  
 
8. Barriers to going to court 
In the alimony survey, only 17 out of 120 respondents (or 14 percent) had divorced at the Islamic 
Court and thus according to national law. An overwhelming majority (86 percent) did not divorce 
at the Islamic Court. These parties are unable to seek enforcement of post-divorce legal rights, 
such as alimony rights. What are the reasons for people in Cianjur not to divorce at the Islamic 
Court, as is stipulated by national law?  
                                                 
52 These interpretations can either be based on physical conditions like the time of the first menstruation for girls and 
a first wet dream for boys, or take the psychological condition of being mature as starting point.  
53 Marriage law: 41c. 
54 Law on Islamic Courts No. 7 1989 jo. No. 3 2006, article 66(5). 
55 KHI:156e. 
56 KHI:156f. 
57 Government Regulation (GR) regarding permission to marry and divorce for civil servants  (GR No. 10 1983 as 
amended by GR No. 45 1990) 
58 GR No. 10 1983:8(2-6). 
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No marriage certificate 
To obtain full legal status, all Muslim divorces in Indonesia must be sanctioned by the Islamic 
Court. One of the main preconditions to filing for divorce at the Islamic Court, as well as to 
obtaining a court decision on alimony and child support, is that the marriage is registered and that 
the couple possesses a marriage certificate (akte nikah).  Cammack et al (2007) have calculated 
that around half of Muslim divorces in the 1980s in Indonesia took place out of court. This has 
important consequences for the legal rights of divorcees and their children, as the women 
involved are unable to file for alimony or child support in the Islamic Court. 
 
The alimony survey indicates that in Cianjur, between 73 and 79 percent59 of divorced women 
did register their marriage. However, only 14 percent of all interviewed women divorced 
officially, namely via the Islamic Court. This is a much lower figure than the figure calculated by 
Cammack et al. 
 
We can concluded the lack of a marriage certificate is not the main barrier preventing women 
from accessing court. Many women who hold marriage certificates still decide to divorce outside 
court or ‘according to religion’ (menurut agama). Nurleawati (2007) argued that in marital 
affairs, Indonesian Muslims tend to value ‘law according to religion’ above ‘law according to 
national law’. Interviews I conducted with divorcees support this view. 
  
Psychological and cultural barriers 
The fact that divorce ‘according to religion’ is the method chosen by most Indonesians limits the 
opportunities for ex-wives to take legal action and demand alimony payment from their former 
husbands. Many women can only politely request a contribution from a former husband who has 
failed to pay alimony (33 percent), and most take no action at all (67 percent), saying that they 
‘don't want to make things difficult' (nggak mau bikin ribet). The question is whether there are 
gendered, cultural reasons that explain women’s unwillingness to confront their former husbands.  
 
More than 90 percent of the women say that they regard the husband as the head of the family. 
This aligns with the position under the Law regarding Marriage. In relation to divorce, most 
women agree that a husband ‘has the right to divorce his wife’ (57 percent against 37 percent 
disagree), while only 43 percent agree that ‘a wife has the right to divorce her husband’ (with 35 
percent disagreeing). According to Indonesian national Islamic law, women are entitled to 
request a divorce on the same grounds as men. However, a large percentage of women in Cianjur 
view divorce solely as a male right.  
 
If we single out those who divorced at the Islamic Court, a different picture emerges. A much 
higher percentage (65 percent) are of the view that women have the right to initiate divorce. This 
is not surprising, as 87 percent of divorces at the Islamic Court of Cianjur are initiated by the 
wife.60 However, women who go to court seldom claim alimony, allegedly because they ‘want to 
be independent from the husband’ (mau lepas dari suami).61 
                                                 
59 The number is uncertain because 6 percent of the respondents did not answer the question. 
60 In 2006, 356 divorces (77 percent) at the Islamic Court of Cianjur were initiated by the wife, and 104 (23 percent) 
by the husband. In 2007, there were 373 divorces initiated by the wife (84 percent) compared to 72 (16 percent) by 
the husband. In 2008, the number of divorces initiated by the wife increased to 478 (87 percent) compared to  71 (13 
percent) initiated by the husband (Laporan Tahunan Pengadilan Agama Cianjur 2006; 2007; and 2008).  
61 Interview with Judge Munawar of the Islamic Court of Cianjur, November 24, 2008. 
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In conclusion, it appears that a traditional view on the role of the husband in divorce is an 
important barrier to women requesting divorce at the Islamic Court and/or applying for an order 
regarding child alimony.  According to this view, the husband is the leader of the family, and he 
alone holds divorce rights in the form of the talak. However, women also express their wish to be 
independent from their former husbands and view asking them for alimony more as a burden than 
a right. 
 
Figure 9. The right to divorce only is with the husband 
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Figure 10. A wife has the right to divorce her husband 
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Practical barriers 
Distance between a person’s residence and the court is certainly a practical barrier. There are far 
more divorce cases (72 percent in 2007) involving couples who live within 30 km of the court 
than those that fall outside this  range (28 percent).62 Circuit courts are initiated to tackle this 
                                                 
62 Laporan Tahunan Pengadilan Agama Cianjur 2007 and Register Pengadilan Agama Cianjur 2007 (own 
analyses). 
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problem. In 2008, circuit court sessions were held bimonthly in different southern towns in the 
district of Cianjur. A budget cut from the Supreme Court reduced the circuit court sessions to 
monthly sessions in a single southern location, the town Pagelaran. As each divorce case will 
involve a minimum of three sessions, people are still required to travel to the court themselves as 
well. 
 
Cost is another reason not to go to court. A standard court procedure costs Rp 290 thousand,63 a 
large amount of money for someone earning less than Rp 500 thousand. This does not take into 
account additional travelling costs that must be paid for the parties and their witnesses to attend 
the minimum of three court hearings. The further the distance to the court, the higher the costs. 
Furthermore, qualitative data reveals that people perceive the procedural costs to be much higher 
than the official costs. Many people think that a court divorce costs over Rp 1 million. 
Unfortunately, if an unofficial middleman (calo) is used to take care of the paperwork, people 
could in fact end up paying these inflated amounts.64 
 
Knowledge about pro deo 
Few people know that households registered by the sub-district as a poor household are entitled 
to request a free (pro deo) divorce. Despite this, about 10 percent of the cases heard by the 
Islamic Court of Cianjur between 2007 and 2008 were free of charge.65 Remarkably, over this 
period only one talak divorce (initiated by the husband) was listed as a pro deo case. According 
to the Law regarding Islamic Courts,66 the person who initiates the divorce must pay the 
procedural costs. Apparently the Islamic Court of Cianjur is more prone to approve pro deo 
litigation in cerai gugat cases (initiated by the wife) than in talak cases. The availability of pro 
deo divorce makes the court much more accessible for poor women. However, according to court 
personnel, the Islamic Court of Cianjur’s budget would not be sufficient to cover any significant 
increase in pro deo cases. 
 
9. Implementation of the law: negotiating a balance 
As discussed in Part 7 above, there are no big differences between Indonesian state law and 
traditional Islamic jurisprudence with regard to substantive alimony rules for Muslims. A 
situation in which there are no normative controversies between the State and the Islamic 
establishment should facilitate a ‘proper’ implementation of state law by the Islamic Court of 
Cianjur67. Is this the case? What other factors and actors influence the quality of implementation 
of alimony rules by the Islamic Court of Cianjur? Does the fact that state alimony rules are 
uncontested within Islamic circles also mean that paying alimony is cultural practice in  a Muslim 
district as Cianjur? To what extent do people arrange and execute alimony privately?  
 
                                                 
63 This was the divorce fee for 2008. 
64 Judge Dedeh Saida stated that in remote areas people are usually brought to the court by middleman, mostly amil 
who usually demand much higher procedural costs (personal communication, November 24, 2008). 
65 My own calculations of the pro deo data in the monthly reports (laporan bulanan) of the Islamic Court of Cianjur 
for 2007 and 2008. For some reason, pro deo is not incorporated into the annual reports. In 2007, 72 of a total of 862 
cases (8.4 percent) were free of charge, while in 2008, 96 of a total of 914 cases (10.5 percent) were free of charge.  
66 Law No 7 of 1989 regarding the Islamic Court. 
67 Nurlaelawati (2007) indicates that many anomalous decisions within the Islamic court occur because some 
innovations in state law regarding Islamic law as established in the Compilation of Islamic Law are not accepted by 
Islamic court judges. The alimony provisions, however, are uncontested within Muslim circles. 
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Out of court implementation of informal alimony agreements 
The fact that the Islamic normative system is still strong for those seeking a divorce does not 
mean that it provides an alternative forum for addressing post-divorce problems. Islamic 
unofficial divorce in Cianjur usually involves the issue of divorce only. In general if a husband 
has pronounced the talak, he will return his former wife to her family. One might question 
whether the Islamic normative system can be considered to provide a forum for addressing the 
issue of divorce at all, given that out of court divorces often only involve family members. In 
practice, only 23 percent of out of court divorces involve an agreement regarding spousal 
alimony, while 30 percent involve a request for agreement on child alimony.68 Most out of court 
divorces do not include alimony agreements at all. In more than half of out of court divorce cases, 
the husband voluntarily pays some irregular form of child support (e.g. pocket money, money for 
schoolbooks).  However, this is perceived by women as insufficient. One might conclude that 
arranging spousal and child alimony is not regular cultural practice. If informal alimony 
arrangements are made, they are usually oral (80 percent) and made within the family sphere, and 
thus do not involve religious figures. However, execution of these agreements by the husband is 
usually poor, and women are often left dissatisfied.  
 
Implementation of alimony legislation at the Islamic Court of Cianjur 
In 2007, the Islamic Court of Cianjur handled 445 divorce cases. There were no separate alimony 
cases listed for hearing. In 27 divorce cases (or about 6 percent), the wife filed for a spousal or 
child alimony request as part of the divorce case.69 One would like to hope that all other divorce 
cases involved out of court agreements regarding alimony, given that providing for spousal 
alimony (in talak cases) and child alimony is a legal obligation. In practice, people usually come 
to court to get a divorce only. Qualitative data reveals that women ‘don’t want to make the 
divorce more complicated’ (nggak mau bikin ribet) by insisting that their alimony rights be 
fulfilled. Mediation is primarily regarded by the Islamic Court of Cianjur as a reconciliation 
effort to save the marriage,70 and addressing post-divorce issues such as alimony does not really 
fit this description. In fact, most requests for alimony (13 of 21 cases) are initiated by the wives 
of civil servants or military personnel, and fall within the special government regulation on 
marriage and divorce for civil servants.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Alimony survey. 
69 This is according to the Register Pengadilan Agama Cianjur.  However, six of the requests were either withdrawn 
by the claimant or expired in the process because the husband did not actually pronounce the talak. These six cases 
were not included in the files of the Islamic Court I obtained. Of the 21 alimony cases I was able to analyze, nine 
contained a request for child alimony, nine a request for spousal alimony and three a request for both spousal and 
child alimony. 
70 Decreasing the number of divorces was one of the goals of the marriage law and the compulsory reconciliation 
effort it stipulates in divorce cases. In Indonesia 5 percent of the cases such efforts are successful resulting in the 
divorce request being withdrawn (Wahyu Widiana 2008). 
71Government Regulation on permission to marry and divorce for civil servants (GR No. 10 1983 jo. GR No. 45 
1990). 
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Box 4. Case:  Court decision on alimony poorly executed  
Despite having recently divorced at the Islamic Court, in March 2006 Ibu Ina and her 
husband decided to give the marriage another try (rujuk) for the sake of their children, 
who at the time were 6 and 4 years old. However, things did not work out.  There were 
often quarrels about how to run the household, and they finally decided to divorce again.  
They had an out of court divorce in August 2006, and in October 2006 her husband 
registered for a talak divorce at the Islamic Court of Cianjur.  
 
The court gave permission for the divorce, and determined that the husband must pay Rp 
250 000 (nafkah mut’ah) and Rp 500 thousand (nafkah iddah) in spousal alimony.  Child 
alimony was set at Rp. 500 thousand per month. 
 
If you read the court file of the case, all went according to procedure. However, according 
to Ibu Ina, this was not entirely the case. As Ibu Ina was not the initiator of the divorce, 
she was not present at the time the divorce request was registered, and thus did not have 
an opportunity to talk with the registrar. Before the first hearing, she received a court 
order informing her that she could respond to her husband claims in her counterclaim. 
This is all according to procedure. However, she felt that staff of the Islamic Court of 
Cianjur had not provided her with enough legal information, because she only became 
aware of her right to seek a court decision on child alimony in the counterclaim 
(rekonvensi) during the final court hearing, when the judge asked about this issue. 
Although she was still able to get a court decision on child alimony, Ibu Ina felt that she 
and her husband were forced to take a quick decision on the matter without having much 
time to think about it. As a result, she reluctantly accepted what she saw as the  low 
amount of  child alimony her husband was willing to pay. ‘How can Rp 500 thousand be 
enough to bring up two children these days? I only accepted the amount because I thought 
that it was better than nothing at all.’ 
 
When her husband came to court to pronounce the talak, he was first asked to pay the 
spousal alimony. However, he had not brought the money. To make the divorce possible 
and prevent further delays, he borrowed the money from Ibu Ina’s parents and was thus 
able to pronounce the talak that day. However, ‘to this day he has not paid back the whole 
amount.’  
 
When asked about her former husband’s execution of the court decision regarding child 
alimony, Ibu Ina is very clear: ‘He does not fulfil his responsibility’. According to Ibu 
Ina, her former husband has more money than he admits to her: ‘How can he buy a new 
motorcycle but not have money for his own children?’  
 
However, she says that she had to accept the situation (pasrah): ‘I am lucky enough to be 
able to provide for my children myself, and moreover I am married again.’  She says that 
she would not have known how to proceed otherwise, and expressed the view that after a 
court decision, the Islamic Court should inform women what legal steps to take if alimony 
is not paid. ‘Now I find it all very confusing.’ 
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According to Ibu Ina, the execution of alimony decisions must be guaranteed: ‘It isn’t all 
just playing a game, is it?’  
 
Implementation of spousal alimony rules in cerai talak cases 
From 2006 till 2008, in all of the divorces initiated by the husband (cerai talak), the Islamic 
Court granted spousal alimony requested in the wife’s counterclaim. In no cases did the court 
refuse such a request on the basis of on the wife’s disobedience (nusyuz), nor were there any 
spousal alimony cases in which  talak ba’in (the third pronouncement of the talak) played a role. 
The fact that there was not a single case in which the court held a wife to be nusyuz, despite many 
accusations of disobedience being made by husbands – for example, the wife leaving the house 
without permission or not performing ‘her marital duties’, all of which are traditionally instances 
of nusyuz – indicates that the Islamic Court of Cianjur considers the rules regarding nusyuz very 
much from the wife’s perspective.  
 
A thorough analysis of (non-civil servant) spousal alimony cases distorts this positive picture 
somewhat. In 2007, in all but one case, the amount of spousal alimony to be paid by the husband 
was below what the wife requested. Moreover, in all but one case, the Islamic Court of Cianjur 
accepted the husband’s statement as to his capacity to pay. Typically, decisions on the amount of 
alimony are not based on written evidence, but instead are negotiated in the courtroom. Where 
alimony is subject to negotiations between the parties, the wife usually accepts the amount her 
husband says he is capable of paying. As one woman put it: ‘I thought I’d better take this money 
rather than not get any money at all’. If negotiations fail, the court must decide. If the wife cannot 
prove that her demand is reasonable – something which is difficult to do through witnesses who 
provide the only indication on the husband’s income in the bulk of the cases in which the 
husband does not have a salaried job – the court will accept the husband’s statement. In general, 
husbands do not provide written evidence to support their statements. 
 
Another issue pointed out to me in interviews with divorcees is that there is a loophole that 
husbands are able to exploit in talak cases.  After the Islamic Court has established the amount of 
alimony, the husband still has to pronounce the talak in order to give the divorce legal status. The 
Islamic Court only gives permission to pronounce the talak, and its decisions in talak divorce do 
not take effect until the pronouncement is made. If after six months the husband has not 
pronounced the talak before court, the case will expire, together with the decision (if any) 
regarding spousal and child alimony.  
 
Box 5. No talak pronouncement, no spousal alimony rights 
In one case in which the court established a high amount of spousal alimony to be paid 
(Rp 15 million), the husband never showed up to pronounce the talak. At present, two 
years after the court decision, the couple is still married according to national law, but 
have divorced according to Islamic law. The wife did not want to initiate a new court 
divorce, because she did not want to undergo another court process until she had found a 
serious new marriage candidate. If she did eventually wish to file for a divorce suit (gugat 
cerai), according to the Compilation of Islamic law she would no longer have spousal 
alimony rights anymore.  
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For this reason, if the husband wants to avoid a court decision on alimony, he can just 
withdraw the suit or not pronounce the talak, knowing that the wife will lose her spousal 
alimony rights if she chooses to initiate divorce proceedings herself.  
 
The power balance in talak cases is therefore in favor of the husband. If he does not want 
to pay, he always can withdraw and wait till his wife is forced to divorce him herself. The 
situation is more equal where the former wife initiates a separate alimony suit after the 
talak divorce has the force of law. However, this would place extra financial and time 
burdens on the wife. In practice women in Cianjur never file separate alimony suits.  
 
Wife initiated divorces: gugat cerai cases 
In gugat cerai cases, the wife has no right to spousal alimony, and may only seek a court decision 
on child alimony. The amount of alimony, which is typically negotiated by the spouses in the 
courtroom, is usually lower than the amount originally claimed by the wife. As with spousal 
alimony in husband initiated divorces, the amount of child alimony in wife initiated divorces as 
appears in the court order is usually in line with the husband’s statement regarding his financial 
capacity. In wife initiated cases, the divorce (including associated orders regarding child 
alimony) is effective from the moment the Islamic Court gives its order, and accordingly, 
husbands are unable to avoid the decision not pronouncing the talak. 
  
Civil servant cases 
Government Regulation No 10 of 1983 as amended by No 45 of 1990 requires civil servants to 
obtain their superior’s permission for divorce, which for Muslim civil servants takes place at the 
Islamic Court. Alimony can be deducted from the ex-husband’s salary and transferred to his 
former wife’s account. In fact, case law states that Islamic Courts do not have jurisdiction to 
determine alimony matters at all, and that this power lies entirely with civil servants’ superiors.72 
Notwithstanding this fact, the Islamic Court of Cianjur accepts alimony cases involving civil 
servants. In fact, more than half of all alimony cases filed in the Islamic Court of Cianjur involve 
civil servants. The rules regarding alimony for civil servants are clear, and the court will typically 
set child alimony at one third of the husband’s salary, as stipulated in the Government 
Regulation.  
 
Box 6. The civil servant case: successful redress 
Ibu Nur was 31 years old in July 2007 when her husband, a civil servant, decided to seek a 
divorce. She and her husband had three children together: a one year old girl, a three year old boy 
and a five year old girl. At first, she disputed the amount of alimony her husband proposed to 
pay, bearing in mind the ages of the children.  However, her husband (who had unofficially and 
without Ibu Nur’s knowledge, married another woman) was persistent. In the end, Ibu Nur felt 
she had to accept his proposal. 
  
After the husband’s superior granted permission for the divorce (it was initially refused on the 
basis of the children’s ages), the Islamic Court  of Cianjur gave permission to the husband to 
pronounce the talak, and ordered him to pay spousal alimony in the form of Rp 1.5 million 
nafkah iddah, and Rp 750 thousand nafkah mut’ah and kiswan.  The husband was also ordered to 
                                                 
72 Yurisprudensi Mahkamah Agung RI  (Supreme Court jurisprudence): 106 K/AG/1997 
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transfer one third of his salary to his former wife as child alimony. Ibu Nur is very satisfied with 
this decision, and during the court process felt that the Islamic Court sided with her.  
 
However, her husband, who did pay the spousal alimony at the Islamic Court, did not at first pay 
the set amount of child alimony. ‘Mostly he only gave some pocket money (uang jajan) when he 
came to meet the children.’ It took Ibu Nur a few months to decide to go to her husband’s 
superior again to complain. ‘I wanted to give him a fair chance first to show before God that he is 
a good person.’ When she finally faced her husband’s superior the man’s reaction was so fierce, 
that she initially backed off. ‘He said he was going to fire him. That was not my intention.’  
 
Only after she heard from a friend that she could ask the treasurer to transfer her ex-husband’s 
child allowance directly to her account did she decide to go to her husband’s office again. ‘The 
treasurer was very cooperative. It was not difficult.’ 
 
Now Ibu Nur automatically receives Rp 1 million per month transferred directly into her account, 
which equals more or less one third of her husband’s salary. 
 
Ibu Nur´s case again shows that legal knowledge is vital. Even when alimony rights and 
foreclosure mechanisms are in place, as is the case for civil servants, one still needs to know what 
steps to take to assert those rights.  
 
As is illustrated in the case above, despite clear provisions in the Government Regulation, the 
Islamic Court often makes its spousal alimony decisions on the basis of KHI.  In these husband 
initiated cases, the Court recognizes Islamic rights such as nafkah iddah, nafkah mut’ah rather 
than the one third of the husband’s salary as stipulated in the Government Regulation.  The 
amount and duration of spousal alimony according to these Islamic rules is less than what would 
be awarded under the Government Regulation. Theoretically, a woman could ‘cash’ their Islamic 
spousal rights based on the KHI, and then proceed to claim their secular rights from the ex-
husband’s superior according to the Government Regulation. However, I have not encountered 
such case. 
 
Flexible procedures 
With regard to procedure, judges at the Islamic Court of Cianjur tend to be creative. They make 
sure that the minimum requirements are fulfilled, but are very flexible in terms of the sequence of 
procedures to be followed. In many cases, this is due to lack of knowledge of the parties. For 
instance, if the parties do not bring at least two witnesses to the second court hearing, the Court 
will typically give them opportunity to bring witnesses to the third and last hearing (reading of 
the court decision). If, after two hearings, a party requests a third hearing (thus fulfilling the 
procedural requirement that there be at least three hearings), the court will not list a separate 
hearing for the reading of the court decision, but instead will immediately decide the case.  
 
The main reason for this flexibility appears to be the high case load. On busy days, a single 
presiding judge will hold twelve court hearings, taking only a single break. It is not unusual to 
have a judge hear ten matters in a row. For this reason, judges try to be as time-effective as 
possible, and achieve this through procedural flexibility. 
 
With regard to evidence, judges will check the evidence (mainly marriage certificates, identity 
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cards, and in case of civil servants the superior’s permission to divorce), and if something is 
amiss they will advise the as to how evidence should be prepared. The main problem is that the 
names in different pieces of evidence do not precisely correspond due to sloppiness of state 
officials or the parties themselves. Clients are given the opportunity to correct this. In some 
cases, the Islamic Court allows the parties to provide the corrected piece of evidence after the 
court decision.  If the parties provided more evidence than is required by law, the unsatisfactory 
evidence will simply be removed. 
 
Notwithstanding this flexibility regarding procedural law, in the over one hundred cases I 
attended, the judges of the Islamic Court of Cianjur did generally manage to provide justice 
seekers with a process by which both sides were heard evenly.  
 
Poor witnesses 
In many cases, there is a low level of awareness of the role of witnesses in the court process. 
Witnesses with no or very little knowledge of the case are brought to court. The consequence for 
litigants can be that the case is weakened by their own witnesses. For example, one witness, when 
asked by a judge what he thought was his role in court, answered: ‘I am here to witness the court 
process’. The same witness clearly lacked any knowledge of the marital situation, and gave 
inconsistent statements. Finally, he became so nervous that he decided to withdraw all the 
statements he had made. 
  
As most circumstantial evidence relevant to alimony cases is witness evidence, awareness of the 
role of witnesses should be improved. Or more correctly, since most decisions are negotiated 
between the spouses, and witnesses can improve a party’s bargaining position, the parties should 
be informed as to the importance of thinking carefully about which witnesses to bring. 
 
Judges’  rhetorical powers 
Judges at the Islamic Court of Cianjur sometimes use their authority to influence the court 
process. One way of doing this is by trying to convince litigants to settle alimony requests out of 
court, and suggesting that parties do not include a claim regarding alimony in the case, or even 
withdraw an alimony claim already made ‘so that the case will proceed smoothly.’ In general, the 
flexibility of the Islamic Court in Cianjur does not seem to have any significant negative 
influence upon the court process. Judges are willing to be flexible with court procedure in an 
effort to enable both plaintiffs and litigants to be heard. Even poor witnesses with no clear 
contribution to the case are given time to speak, seemingly just to give each side the feeling that 
their cases are given the same weight and that each of their families have had their say. However, 
if a judge discourages a woman from including an application for alimony in her counterclaim 
just to speed up the court process, a line would seem to have been crossed. 
 
Another method applied by judges to influence the process is using moralistic rhetoric. In one 
joint marital property  case (not an alimony case but relevant none the less), the husband had a 
legal right to demand half of his wife’s earnings as a migrant worker in Saudi Arabia.  However, 
when he made his demand, the judge reacted as follows: ‘Aren't you ashamed!? You were not 
even able to fulfill the duty of a husband as provider for your wife and children and now you ask 
for half your wife's money? Maybe it is better if you settle this with your wife through 
mediation’. At this point, the husband was almost obliged to agree to mediation, and he withdrew 
his demand from the case. Eventually, after mediation, he agreed to receive only one sixth of his 
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wife's earnings, rather than his initial demand for half. 
 
10. Execution of alimony decisions 
With the exception of cases involving civil servants, justice seekers do not use the legal 
mechanisms available for the enforcement of court decisions on child alimony. This situation 
makes court decisions unsustainable. Court decisions are widely ignored, resulting in 
dissatisfaction amongst female divorcees. It is difficult to enforce Islamic Court decisions on 
child alimony unless the husband has a regular salary and enforcement mechanisms – such as on-
the-spot payment of the total amount of alimony (such as is the case with spousal alimony), or 
foreclosure of salary for civil servants – are readily available. However, even in cases involving 
civil servants, women usually try to find a private solution first. It seems that women want to give 
their former husband a chance to fulfill their religious and moral duty first, and only reluctantly 
would approach the former husband’s superior if he fails to fulfill his duty.  
 
Box 7. Execution of court decisions in Herziene Indonesische Reglement (Art.196-200) 
 
¾ Courts have jurisdiction to force parties to comply with court decisions if they do not 
comply voluntarily. 
¾ Forced compliance will only occur after a request is submitted by the plaintiff to the Chair 
of the Court of the court concerned.  
¾ If the request is sustained, the court will summon the litigant to fulfill his duty within a 
certain time limit.  
¾ If the summonsed party does not appear before the court, the Chair of the Court will issue 
a court confiscation order. 
¾ Confiscation will proceed with assistance of the police. 
¾ Confiscated goods will be sold by auction. 
 
Judges at the Islamic Court were a bit hesitant to comment on the enforcement of court decisions. 
To their knowledge, the Islamic Court of Cianjur has never received a demand for enforcement of 
a court decision on child alimony. There was some confusion among judges of the Court as to the 
options for enforcement. According to some, unpaid alimony does not constitute a debt, and as 
there are no specific sanctions for non-payment of alimony, women seeking to enforce alimony 
decisions have no official enforcement options. However, according to procedural law, all 
decisions of the Islamic Court are executable. In practice, compliance with alimony decisions is 
regarded as a voluntary moral duty of the husband, and this results in poor and irregular 
compliance.73 This situation is not likely to change until enforcement mechanisms are used to 
ensure compliance. 
 
Execution of out of court alimony arrangements 
Outside court, martial disputes are usually addressed via the families of the couple, sometimes 
with a village or lower level authority (kepala RT or amil) functioning as mediator. However, this 
mechanism appears to break down after a divorce has taken place, and the bond between the 
families is already broken. Women are also very reluctant to further complicate matters with their 
                                                 
73  The situation is similar in Malaysia, where the kadi (judge) has power to invoke legal sanctions, but is often 
sympathetic towards poor husbands who are unable to pay alimony, and therefore ‘commonly refrains from 
imposing even relatively minor sanctions’  (Peletz, M.G. 2002:91). 
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former family-in-law, and so unwillingly accept non-payment. The main conclusion is that there 
is no normative framework, state or non-state, available to address post-marriage child alimony 
grievances arising out of unrecognized out-of-court divorces.  It is clear that non-court 
arrangements regarding child alimony are also poorly executed, and alternative normative 
systems do not provide a solution to this problem. 
 
11. Conclusion and recommendations 
Most families in Cianjur live close to the poverty line. A divorce, after which the care of the 
children is typically left entirely to the mother, therefore creates a real risk that it will lead to 
impoverishment. Fathers often fail to fulfill their legal obligation to provide sufficient child 
alimony. As a result, a large majority of women in Cianjur are dissatisfied with their former 
husband's contribution to the children’s upbringing. Their main grievance is that husbands don't 
execute (written or oral) child alimony arrangements, court decisions, or their legal, religious and 
moral obligations. Besides politely requesting a contribution, women rarely take any action to 
improve their situation. Almost all women in Cianjur are aware of their right to alimony, yet few 
are aware of the steps they can take to assert and materialize these rights. 
 
A large majority of women who hold marriage certificates still divorce outside of court. This 
means that they have no right to seek a court decision on (spousal and child) alimony. The main 
barriers preventing women from going to court are: procedural costs (including incorrect 
information as to the level of cost involved), psychological barriers (expecting a difficult process, 
unwillingness to face husband and family), effort (non-court divorce is swift and easily arranged) 
and cultural factors (family or husband insists on non-court divorce). Improving women’s 
awareness of the actual procedural costs at the Islamic Court, and of the option of free (pro deo) 
court proceedings for poor families could improve this situation. 
 
Of the women who divorce at the Islamic Court of Cianjur, only a small proportion (5-6 percent) 
seek a court decision on (spousal and or child) alimony as part of the divorce case. Most women 
do not seek any arrangement regarding alimony, and even if they do, 30 percent opt for an out-of-
court arrangement. Women are not always aware of the option to file for alimony, at no extra 
cost, as part of their counterclaim in the divorce proceedings. It is likely that more women would 
take this option if they knew it existed. The Islamic Court itself obviously has the most important 
role in providing this information. 
 
At the Islamic Court, the amount of alimony is usually negotiated between the spouses. Women 
often accept the amount proposed by their husband in his statement of financial capacity. If the 
court has to decide, the amount is usually lower than what the wife initially requested. Judges 
also tend to simply accept the husband’s statement of financial capacity, although they sometimes 
ask witnesses what amount of money is considered sufficient for a child’s upbringing in the area 
in which the wife lives. 
 
The Islamic Court of Cianjur has an increasing case load, and this is placing pressure upon the 
personnel of the court to ensure that processes are time-efficient. For this reason, judges allow 
procedural discrepancies, so long as they are satisfied that the process remains just. In general, 
they seem to succeed in this respect. However, in some cases, judges discourage women from 
including claims regarding child alimony as part of their divorce case ‘to speed up the process’. 
Women can be intimidated by this, and as a result they refrain from making an alimony claim 
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which would have legal effect. 
 
In practice, the enforceability of a court decision on alimony, especially child alimony, is 
questionable.  The Islamic Court in Cianjur itself does not regard these decisions as enforceable, 
as non-payment of alimony is not regarded as a debt. Moreover, with the exception of cases 
involving civil servants, there are no special legal sanctions, and no special mechanisms (such as 
foreclosure of salary) in place to enforce court decisions on child alimony.  To date, the Islamic 
Court of Cianjur has never received a request for the enforcement of a court decision regarding 
child alimony. 
 
This situation makes court decisions unsustainable, and in many cases court decisions are simply 
ignored. If easy enforcement mechanisms (such as foreclosure) were in place, such as those 
applying to civil servants, a much more positive picture may arise. However, one must realize 
that legal solutions like the one contained in the regulations for civil servants are only be 
effective where the ex-husband has a stable income in the form of a fixed salary. Of course, the 
social reality for the poor is very different, and therefore legislative solutions are unlikely to 
improve the situation for the poor.  
 
Alternative forums do not appear to be available either. Non-court arrangements regarding child 
alimony are usually made within the family, but are poorly executed. Alternative normative 
systems, such as the Islamic normative system, do not provide a better solution to ensure 
compliance with informal child alimony arrangements.  
 
Having said all that, it remains a fact that women themselves elect not to take action with regard 
to the enforcement of child alimony rights. Economic independence is an important factor in this. 
Most women (about 75 percent) say that they are no worse off economically after divorce, 
because they work and because of the safety net provided by their parents. Alimony payments for 
these women are regarded more as a matter of religious duty than as an economic issue. This 
could explain the unwillingness of many women to apply much effort in the resolution of their 
alimony related grievances. 
 
For women who are worse off economically after divorce (about 25 percent), and therefore have 
a greater need for the alimony contribution, it remains difficult for them to obtain regular 
payments from their former husbands. Husbands will – some perhaps truthfully – claim they 
don’t have the money. Further, many women are unwilling to face their former husbands, 
especially if the husband has remarried. In many other cases, the husband has moved away and is 
untraceable. In most cases, the idea of going to court is not even considered. So what can be done 
to improve the situation? 
 
In general, unless the former husband has a stable income (which offers the possibility of 
foreclosure), it would be difficult to change the current situation of irregular and lax alimony 
payments. 
 
Legal sanctions for non-payment – the solution most frequently proposed by experts and the 
judiciary – are important.  However, this option would only be effective if women themselves 
were to respond to non-payment by taking legal action . As we have seen, women rarely elect to 
do so.  
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In practice, the most frequently used enforcement mechanism is moral pressure. Through state 
and religious education, women and men alike can be made aware that alimony rights are 
established in both national law as Islamic law, and that payment is both a legal and a religious 
duty. One option would be to incorporate lessons on marital (including post-divorce) rights into 
the junior high school curriculum. In this way, women could not only be taught what are their 
rights, but also how they can assert their rights in the Islamic Court. This legal knowledge could 
become a weapon in post-divorce alimony negotiations. And if more women take the initiative to 
seek legal sanctions, such as a penalty (dwangsom) or confiscation of assets, the psychological 
pressure on former husbands to pay will increase, and moral pressure may become more 
effective.  
 
Most importantly, the execution of court orders must be regulated. In fact, Indonesian law already 
allows a party to seek a penalty (dwangsom) if another party does not comply with an obligation 
imposed by a court decision. The fact that this legal mechanism is not utilized demonstrates why 
the solution to the problem of enforcement does not lie in creating new legal sanctions, but rather 
in creating and socializing standard procedures for how to apply the existing ones. 
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